We consider a controlled
have been more cost effective to reject them upon arrival. A remedy to either problem; congestion control upon arrival or immediately before service, is to have the customers meet two decision-makers. The first provides congestion control when customers arrive to the system as is typical in admission control models.
The second occurs after each service completion when the server assesses the customer in the front of the queue, the service requirements of the customer are revealed and the server may decide it is unwise to serve the customer. See Figure 1 .
Suppose now that the server's recommendation to reject a customer may not always be honored. That is to say that with some probability the decision is ignored and the server must serve the customer. Given our previous discussion it seems intuitive that each decision-maker would allow admittance to the queue and to service until such time that the number of customers reaches some level or control limit, after which admittance would not be allowed. Since the service requirements of the customer in service have been revealed, the limits should depend on this information as well. Such a policy is called a switching curve policy.
Furthermore, since the second decision-maker adds flexibility to the process, the higher the probability this decision is honored, the higher the long-run average reward should be.
As further motivation for this study, we assert that this model serves as a baseline for several models in practice. Consider for example a manufacturing setting where one machine must perform multiple tasks.
The gatekeeper decides which jobs will be accepted and prepared for service as job requests arise. As service will not commence immediately, and assessing each part, and keeping this information may not be feasible, the gatekeeper does not know the service rate of the job when it arrives. The assessment of the job will be done immediately prior to service. The server then can decide if the job should be processed or rerouted somewhere else in the system. Similarly, in telecommunications, call centers receive a call and often do not immediately classify the call's importance. The gatekeeper corresponds to traditional congestion control and relates to the call originally getting through. After sitting in queue for some time, perhaps while some information is gathered about the customer and the present state of the system, a classification is made. The server may then decide if the caller should be served or asked to call at a later time.
We add the further generality that the server's recommendation may be "overruled" in which case it would be forced to serve the customer. By allowing the probability that a rejection by the server is honored to vary from zero to one, we may evaluate the value of having a second decision-maker. The remainder of the paper is devoted to proving the following two results.
Theorem 1 There exists a long-run average optimal policy that is a generalized monotone switching curve policy (see Definition 5).

Theorem 2 Let
be the probability that a rejection by the server is honored. The optimal gain, , is increasing in . The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is dedicated to a short literature review. We gather necessary definitions from average reward Markov decision process theory in Section 3. The model formulation can be found in Section 4. The proofs of the main results are in Section 5. We conclude with some examples and concluding remarks in Sections 6 and 7, respectively.
Literature Review
There is a vast literature on the control of queues and we will not give an exhaustive review here. Instead, we will highlight those papers of particular relevance to our current work. The idea of a control limit policy or a trunk reservation policy (see Definition 4) was originally reported by Yadin and Naor [18] for a server with vacations and proved to be optimal by Heyman [9] . This was later applied to a finite customer class, finite capacity, queueing system by Miller [14] and continued by Lippman and Ross [13] for a single-server with uncountable customer classes. Helm and Waldmann [7] showed in a very general setting if enough information is included in the state space the existence of control limit policies is still guaranteed. When the state space is more than one dimension, for example when there is more than one station, a control limit policy is called a switching curve policy. Hajek [6] discusses such a model with two stations where routing decisions must be made. A good survey of early papers on admission and service control in queueing systems was produced by Stidham [16] .
More recently, optimal control limit admission policies for queues which operate in series or with delayed information were studied by Ghoneim and Stidham [5] and Altman and Stidham [4] , respectively.
Furthermore, Xu and Shanthikumar [17] discuss a queue with expulsion control akin to our second decisionmaker. Lewis and Puterman [10, 11] showed that optimal policies may vary when a more sensitive optimality criterion, bias optimality, is used if the reward was received upon service completion as opposed to upon admittance into the system; the bias exhibits implicit discounting. None of the above mentioned papers are concerned with the interplay between two decision-makers making decisions about the same customers at varying points of the queueing process and with differing information.
For models with more than one decision-maker stochastic game theory has proved useful (cf. Altman [2] ). In essence, most stochastic game models assume that two or more decision-makers are active at different times with different objective functions. A (Nash) equilibrium is sought where no player can benefit by deviating from the proposed policy. For a nice example of how this methodology has been applied to the control of queues see Altman [1] . There is also a survey by the same author that covers stochastic games and many related queueing problems in telecommunications systems (see [3] ). In the present model, each decision-maker has the same objective. Hence, the second decision-maker adds the value of another opportunity to control congestion; there is no competition between the gatekeeper and the server.
Average Reward Markov Decision Processes
In this section we briefly discuss the components of a Markov decision process (MDP) and define the optimality criterion. Although the notation may be slightly different, all of the following ideas are outlined nicely in Puterman [15] or Hernandez-Lerma and Lasserre [8] . The problem we pose may be modeled as an infinite horizon, finite action, countable state space Markov decision process. However, we make an assumption on the holding cost so as to assure that an optimal policy need only consider a finite subset of 
We call an MDP unichain if all stationary policies generate a Markov chain with one recurrent class (and possibly some transient states). It is well-known that for the set of stationary, deterministic policies on a unichain, finite state and action space MDP, the limit in (2) exists and is independent of the initial state (cf. Section 8.4 of Puterman [15] ). Furthermore, restricting attention to this class of policies in fact is no restriction at all since the supremum over this smaller set is equivalent to that over all policies when the MDP is unichain, has bounded rewards, and finite state and action spaces (see Theorem 8.4.5 of Puterman).
The optimal gain of an MDP may be computed by solving the following system of linear equations (cf.
Chapter 8 of Puterman [15] ): assessment completion.
When the expected increase in the holding costs caused by accepting an arriving customer exceeds the expected reward offered by the customer it is optimal to reject that customer. When there are ¤ customers in the system, a lower bound on the expected increase in cost to the system for the arriving customer is
. To see this, suppose we start two processes on the same probability space. The first, process 1, starts with
customers, while the second, process 2, starts with ¤ customers. Assume further that the r @ © customer for each process is of the same (unknown) class for y ª ¤
and that the servers of both processes begin either serving a class customer or assessing the customer in the front of the queue. Now assume that process 1 uses a fixed policy ) while process 2 uses the same policy except that decisions are made as though it had the same number of customers as process 1. What all of this implies is that the processes follow the same sample paths except that process 1 continues to have one more customer in the system until such time that the queue of process 1 drains, after which the processes couple. The difference in cost between the two processes until the first transition is
. Similarly, the difference in costs until the second transition is at least
(recall the convexity of ). Continue in this fashion for the first ¤ transitions. Summing these differences yields ¤ ¡ x t u as claimed.
Since the holding cost is assumed convex, increasing and strictly positive when the system is non-empty,
. Let¯be the smallest non-negative integer such that
. It must then be optimal to reject all arriving customers when there are¯or more customers in the system. Note that when this policy is employed there may be customers in the system for only a finite amount of time for any h 2 (transience). These states have no effect on the long-run average reward. . We let 1 correspond to when the gatekeeper should accept an arriving customer while 2 corresponds to reject. Thus, The rewards
Next we state the AOE for the above model. We include in the notation the added dependence on
where
Note that when Ȫ we replace the "max" in (10) and (11) , respectively, since rejecting customers is assumed to be optimal in these states. When the system is empty,
In each state 
. Thus,
. From (10) and (11) the decision to accept or reject arriving customers is dependent on whether
is positive or negative.
Similarly, from (12) the decision to serve customers depends on
The final definitions of this section are the usual definition of a monotone switching curve (cf. Altman [2] ) and a generalization of that definition. 
Definition 4 Suppose in each state
. Figure 2 shows an example of a monotone switching curve policy on a subset of the state space. It should be clear that on this subset the policy satisfies Definition 4. To see that it also satisfies Definition 5, let the partial ordering
We say that
, and 3. The monotone switching curve policy has the intuition that the gatekeeper is less willing to allow customers to enter the system when there are more customers in the system or if the server is working slower.
Moreover, the lowest class recommended for service by the server increases as the number of customers increases. Given these observations in order to prove Theorem 1 we show that there exists to the other control limits.
Results
In this section we prove the main results of the paper; the existence of a gain optimal policy that is a generalized monotone switching curve and that the optimal gain is increasing in . . Recall that it is optimal to reject an arriving customer when in state
be the lowest number of customers in the system for which this holds. The last two statements of Proposition 6 imply that
for all h ; is an arrival control limit. Since was an arbitrary customer class, we have the existence of optimal arrival control limits.
It is optimal not to serve a Class j customer after assessment when
. A similar argument to the previous for arrival control limits holds for the existence of service control limits using statement 1 of Proposition 6. . Proposition 7 guarantees that we also have
. The result follows. The order of the service control limits follows in the same manner.
The final contribution of this paper examines the average reward as the probability that rejection by the server is honored increases. We first state a useful lemma which appears as Proposition 8.6.1b in Puterman [15] . . Consider the system where çç is the probability that rejection by the server is honored. Let e çç denote the optimal gain for this system. Finally, let
.
where the equality follows since 
Examples
In this section we present several examples to emphasize the results shown in the previous section. The first example shows that the optimal control limits may change as changes.
Example 1
Suppose the parameter values are those found in Table 1 . Recall when there are customers in the system it is optimal to accept (reject) an arriving customer during assessment if
. We see in Figure 3 (a) the optimal control limit, . Of course
for all and all as expected from Proposition 6. Furthermore, one might notice that
is increasing in . Although
we were unable to prove this holds in general, it held true in every example we considered. Intuitively, this implies that the control limit ä w increases in ; the more likely the server's decision to reject is honored, the more willing the gatekeeper is to let customers join the queue.
As a decision-maker one would like to know the increase in the long-run average reward say from when Å ª (server's rejection never honored) to Å É (server's rejection always honored). This in some sense gives a measure of the value of adding a second decision-maker. In Example 2 we consider only two cases; when k ö and when k º
. The optimal control levels for
However, when
This difference in the optimal policy implies that for some models the second decision-maker can make a crucial difference. In fact, in the present example there is a ³ { ô ð increase in the optimal gain. This may not be that surprising since Class 4 customers have significantly higher service rates and higher probability that they will arrive while someone is in assessment or service.
Conclusions
We have shown that the optimal structure of admission control and service policies is that of monotone switching curve policy. The control limits are ordered by the service rate and the reward offered by each class of customer. Moreover, each control limit is inherently linked to the probability that the server's rejection is honored by the system. We concluded that one way to measure the value of the second decisionmaker is to consider the change in the long-run average reward as changes. In Example 2 the percent increase was large and the policy so significantly different for varying values of that the savvy manager would need to give serious consideration to modifying the system with only one decision-maker.
There is a nice alternative proof of Theorem 2 that was provided by the referee. For each fixed policy in the system whose second decision-maker is honored with probability , the proof uses a sample path argument to construct a policy in the system whose second decision-maker is honored with probability ç ¦ that has the same average reward. Since the optimal average reward in the latter system maximizes the average reward over all policies in this system, the result follows.
It might also be noted that in fact the addition of a second decision-maker is equivalent to a single gatekeeper that performs admission control upon arrival and upon assessment of each customer. This follows since events may only occur one at a time. However, we find the explanation with two decision-makers more illuminating. Further thanks must also be given to the referee for many helpful comments and considerations that aided in expanding the scope and in the enhancing the readability of the paper.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 6: Fix . Consider the following inductive statement we refer to as statement . We do so by proving (23), (24), (25) separately.
Proof of (23): From (10) we have,
Hence,
and (23) holds for Ë â
. In fact, (23) trivially also holds for
(27) Proof of (24): From (11),
where the inequality follows from (27). Since ( is increasing in
where the inequality follows since ( ¢ is convex in and
by the previous remarks.
Thus, statement ú V ü holds.
Assume now that statement
holds. We must prove (23), (24) and (25) for .
Proof of (23): From (10),
Denote the set of customer classes which if they are in service it is optimal to accept an arriving when there . Consider the second term in (33)
There are four possibilities 
In each of the first two cases the non-positivity is guaranteed since "accept" being optimal in state 
Each case in the (45) and (46) is non-negative by applying the induction hypothesis, Proposition 6, or by appealing to the fact that "accept" or "reject" is optimal in the respective states. Since in each case (42) implies
, the result follows.
